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Abstract—Recent measurements of the Windows code signing
certificate ecosystem have highlighted various forms of abuse
that allow malware authors to produce malicious code carry-
ing valid digital signatures. However, the underground trade
that allows miscreants to acquire such certificates is not well
understood. In this paper, we take a step toward illuminating
this trade by investigating the certificate black market from
two separate perspectives. First, we identify 4 leading vendors
of Authenticode certificates, we document how they conduct
business, and we estimate their market share. Second, we
dig deeper into the demand for code signing certificates by
collecting a dataset of recently signed malware and by using it
to study the relationships among malware developers, malware
families, and certificates. We also establish indirect links be-
tween these two data sets by inferring that 5 certificates found
in our signed malware samples had likely been purchased
from one of the black market vendors we observed. Using
this approach, we document a apparent shift in the methods
that malware authors employ to obtain valid digital signatures.
While prior studies have reported that most of the code signing
certificates used by malware had been issued to legitimate
developers and later compromised, we report that, in 2017,
this method is not prevalent anymore. Instead, we gather
evidence consistent with a stable underground market that
represents the leading source of code signing certificates for
malware authors. We also find that the need to bypass platform
protections such as Microsoft Defender SmartScreen plays
an important role in driving the demand for Authenticode
certificates. Together, these findings suggest that the trade in
certificates issued for abuse represents an emerging segment
of the underground economy.
1. Introduction
How can Alice ensure that an executable program de-
veloped by Bob has not been tampered with or replaced by
malware? As a solution to this problem, modern computing
platforms have adopted digital signatures, where the trust
derives from a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). This infras-
tructure includes trusted third parties known as Certificate
Authorities (CAs), who verify the identity of publishers such
as Bob. Bob, the software publisher, may obtain a code
signing certificate from these CAs through a vetting process
where his identity is verified. After acquiring the certificate,
Bob can sign his software and embed the certificate that
binds the signing keys to Bob’s identity. Alice, the client,
can then check the validity of the certificate and verify the
signature to ensure that the software really comes from Bob.
Although a digital signature does not guarantee that the
software is safe to execute, it helps to establish trust in the
program. In consequence, valid digital signatures can help
malware bypass platform protections and anti-virus scan-
ners [6], [11]. A well-known example is the Stuxnet worm,
which was digitally signed using keys stolen from two
Taiwanese semiconductor companies [6]. Prior measurement
studies have reported many cases of compromised or abused
certificates that were embedded in malware [6], [7], [11],
[20], [23] or potentially unwanted programs (PUPs) [1],
[14], [16], [28]. While publishers of PUPs (e.g. adware) may
obtain code-signing certificates legitimately from CAs [12],
[16], [25], malware authors typically aim to conceal their
identities when signing their samples. As this prevents them
from undergoing the CAs’ identity verification process, this
raises the question how do malware authors acquire code-
signing certificates?
A longitudinal study of malware signed between 2003–
2014 [11] reported that most of the certificates involved
had been issued to legitimate software publishers and later
compromised, as in Stuxnet’s case. Recent anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that code signing certificates are also traded
on underground markets [8], [10], [19]. This trade allows
malware creators to purchase a code signing certificate with
a fresh publisher identity and to use it to sign malware.
In this paper, we present the first in-depth analysis of
this underground trade, considering the whole ecosystem
of vendors, malware developers, and certificate issuers, and
investigating the vendor’s market share and the factors that
drive the demand in the market.1 Having inspected 28
forums, 6 link directory websites, 4 general marketplaces
and dozens of websites trading black market goods, we
identify 4 leading vendors of code signing certificates. The
1. A preliminary version of this paper appeared as [15]. In a parallel
study [2], Recorded Future also monitored 4 certificate vendors but did not
analyze in depth the links between these vendors and the signed malware
that appeared in the wild during the same period.
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overall activity of these vendors has been increasing in the
first half of 2017, with one of the vendors setting up his
own e-shop in August 2017. We regularly collected stock
information and analyzed the sales of this e-shop. During
the 104 days of our observation period, the e-shop obtained
a new certificate every two days, on average, and collected
$16,150 in revenue for selling these certificates. A new code
signing certificate generally trades for a few hundred dollars.
Extended Validation (EV) code signing certificates are also
offered for a few thousand dollars each.
To further investigate the impact of this underground
trade on signed malware, we collect 14,221 signed malware
samples using the VirusTotal Hunting API [27] and extract
1,163 certificates from these samples. By analyzing the
subset of samples that also carry a trusted timestamp, we
find that around 45% of the abused certificates are used to
sign malware within the first month after they were issued.
This pattern of abuse is consistent with a black market
that frequently obtains new certificates and makes them
available for general consumption—as observed in our stock
measurements for the code signing e-shop—but would be
difficult to sustain by relying on signing keys stolen from
legitimate publishers. To further corroborate this connection,
we utilize several properties of the certificates to infer that 5
certificates found in our signed malware samples had likely
been purchased from the e-shop during our observation
period.
We analyze the relationships among the actors in this
underground market by building a graph that connects pub-
lisher identities with certificates and signed malware fami-
lies. We identify a large strongly connected component that
contains most of the samples and mainly Russian publisher
identities, with other components being generally small and
well separated. The strong connectivity within the large
component suggests a degree of cooperation among the
various malware developer teams and confidence in the
black market. This cluster also exhibits the highest rate of
burning new certificates, by using around 60% of them to
sign malware within the first month after issuance.
The emergence of this underground trade points to a
growth in the demand for code signing certificates from mal-
ware authors. The requests for certificates on underground
forums and the marketing messages of the four certificate
vendors suggest that a key factor driving this demand is
the need to bypass Microsoft Defender SmartScreen [18], a
certificate reputation system built into Windows 10. In turn,
this demand has created a market opportunity for specialized
vendors who can obtain new certificates regularly and sell
them for immediate use.
In summary, this paper makes four contributions:
• We conduct an exploratory analysis of the under-
ground trade in code signing certificates. We illumi-
nate its business model, marketplaces, and pattern of
transactions.
• We report evidence consistent with a shift in how
malware is signed, as the demand for new certificates
leads to a growing prevalence of certificates issued
for abuse (rather than compromised certificates, as
reported in the prior work).
• We perform a graph-based analysis of the attributes
of signed malware, and we infer new relationships
among malware developers.
• We use indirect evidence to infer that 5 certificates
from digitally signed malware found in the wild had
likely been purchased from the underground market.
We utilize our findings to draw lessons about the role of
the certificate black market in the ecosystem of digitally
signed malware, and we discuss concrete proposals for
facilitating the verification of publisher identities. We release
our data set of certificates extracted from signed malware
samples at https://signedmalware.org.
2. Problem Statement
2.1. Code Signing Overview
Microsoft Authenticode [17] is a standard for digitally
signing Windows portable executables (PE). The digital
signatures allow client platforms to identify the publisher
who developed the software and to ensure the integrity
of the signed executables. Each signature appended to an
executable is accompanied by a code-signing certificate,
which binds the signing key to the publisher’s real iden-
tity. These certificates are issued and signed by Certificate
Authorities (CAs), who are trusted to verify the identities
of the publishers who request code-signing certificates. Each
certificate includes a specification of the dates of issuance
and expiration. To avoid the challenge of replacing binaries
with expired certificates in the field, software publishers
often submit their binaries to Time-Stamping Authorities
(TSAs) and receive unforgeable timestamps, proving when
the binary was signed. Signed binaries that include such
trusted timestamps are considered valid even after the certifi-
cate expires. Together, these roles and procedures represent
the Authenticode public key infrastructure (PKI), which is
the basis for establishing trust in Windows executables.
Unlike the better studied Web PKI, the Authenticode
PKI is opaque, as compromised certificates cannot be dis-
covered systematically through network scanning and there
is no official list of legitimate software publishers. This
facilitates abuse, allowing miscreants to obtain code sign-
ing certificates and to produce valid digital signatures for
malicious code. Several mechanisms have been introduced
to prevent this abuse.
Revocation Requirements. In 2016, the Certificate Author-
ity Security Council (CASC) adopted a set of minimum
requirements for code signing certificates [3]. According to
these guidelines, a CA must promptly investigate and revoke
a code signing certificate after being notified that the certifi-
cate has been used to sign malware. This makes it difficult
for malware authors to reuse code signing certificates.
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EV Certificates. In addition to standard code-signing certifi-
cates, CAs may issue Extended Validation (EV) certificates.
To obtain an EV certificate, the publisher has to pass a
more stringent vetting process. EV certificates convey a
higher degree of trust and are required when signing critical
code (such as Windows drivers) [24]. In consequence, EV
certificates are both more valuable and harder to obtain for
malware authors.
Microsoft Defender SmartScreen. To combat malware,
Microsoft Defender SmartScreen [18] assigns reputation
scores to executables and Authenticode certificates. When
an executable is downloaded on a Windows 10 machine,
SmartScreen attempts to assess its reputation before it allows
the client to launch it. The reputation scores take several
factors into account. For example, EV certificates receive
a good reputation initially. Conversely, if the application,
the URL from where it was downloaded or its code signing
certificate appear on a blacklist, SmartScreen assigns a bad
reputation. SmartScreen reputations can improve over time,
for example when an application garners a track record of
installations on multiple hosts without raising suspicions.
However, if SmartScreen encounters a previously un-
known application, with a valid digital signature that is
valid but is endorsed by a previously unknown certificate,
Windows 10 displays a warning dialog to the user before
launching the application. This represents a challenge for
malware developers who aim to avoid suspicion and to
remain stealthy. Even if they manage to produce a valid
signature for their malware, they must also ensure that their
Authenticode certificate has accumulated sufficient reputa-
tion in SmartScreen to prevent the user warning.
2.2. Underground Certificate Trade
Despite the anti-abuse mechanisms reviewed above, re-
cent measurement studies have systematically uncovered
cases of potentially unwanted programs (PUPs) [1], [12],
[14] and malware [11] carrying valid digital signatures.
These studies have shown that miscreants value the ability
to sign malicious code and that they are able to control
a range of Authenticode certificates. However, this line of
prior work did not shed light on how malware authors obtain
these certificates.2
At the same time, anecdotal evidence [8], [10], [19]
suggests that code signing certificates are traded on under-
ground markets. However, this segment of the underground
economy is not well understood. Prior research has docu-
mented the emergence of similar underground trades in cases
where a malicious task required specialized skills and was in
demand; for example pay-per-install (PPI) services [4], [13],
[25] allow malware developers to focus on implementing
the malicious functionality and to outsource the malware
delivery task. In contrast, the economic forces driving the
2. While publishers of PUPs (e.g. adware) typically do not conceal their
identities [12], [16], [25], which may allow them to acquire certificates
directly from CAs, malware authors cannot rely on this approach.
underground trade in Authenticode certificates have not been
analyzed yet.
This is, in part, due to challenges in collecting data about
the certificate black market. In particular, it is not straight-
forward to locate the marketplaces where these certificates
are being traded. While prior reports mentioned an online
marketplace for anonymous code signing certificates [8],
this marketplace was no longer active at the time of this
writing. Christin collected and released a large dataset by
crawling SilkRoad, a general marketplace for black market
goods [5]; however, our analysis of this dataset did not reveal
any certificates or other goods related to code signing abuse.
Moreover, we were not able to locate any such goods on
other general marketplaces available on the dark web, as
described later on.
2.3. Research Questions
Our goal in this paper is to conduct an exploratory anal-
ysis of the underground trade in code signing certificates.
As a first step toward illuminating this black market, we
aim to gather evidence that would allow us to formulate
hypotheses about the forces driving supply and demand and
to suggest further experiments. Specifically, we ask four
research questions:
Q1: What is the business model? There are three pos-
sible business models for monetizing abusive certificates:
(1) selling the certificates themselves, allowing the malware
developers to control them and use them to sign as many
malware samples as they wish; (2) providing a signing
service, which receives binary submissions from malware
developers and signs these binaries for a fee (in this case, the
malware developers do not control the certificates); and (3)
incorporating code signing into Pay-per-Install (PPI) cam-
paigns, where the service providers decide which binaries
get signed in order to increase their chances of successful
installation. We aim to determine which model is prominent
today’s underground market and to characterize the supply,
the demand, and the pricing strategy. We are also interested
in what drives the demand for certificates—what challenges
drive the malware developers to this black market—as this
reflects the real-world effectiveness of the defenses against
code-signing abuse (reviewed in Section 2.1).
Q2: What are the relationships among the actors in-
volved in the trade? We aim to investigate the connections
among vendors and customers and to assess the stability of
the certificate black market. Evidence of frequently changing
business relationships, vendors selling the same certificate to
multiple customers, or malware authors hoarding certificates
could indicate that the trust among these actors is low
(no honor among thieves). Malware authors cannot depend
on such a black market for producing valid signatures re-
peatedly. In contrast, evidence for communities of malware
developers who cooperate and share certificates, and who
use newly purchased certificates quickly, could point to a
high degree of confidence in the market. Such evidence
would suggest that the current business models are viable
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and that this black market could play a growing role in the
future malware landscape. At the same time, understanding
these underground relationships can suggest interventions
that would effectively disrupt cyber crime operations [26].
Q3: Where do the abusive certificates come from? Cer-
tificates can be either stolen from legitimate publishers or
purchased directly from the CAs anonymously (e.g. by set-
ting up a shell company or impersonating a legitimate one).
Stealing a certificate does not require the malware developer
to pay a fee, and it may not be difficult to steal from careless
publishers who do not protect their signing keys, but this
method does not guarantee a reliable supply of certificates
in the future. On the other hand, obtaining a certificate from
the CA requires the adversary to pay and should be more
difficult to do for malware developers, since they would need
to pass the vetting process without revealing their identities.
However, if adversaries are able to set up a reliable process
for passing the CAs’ vetting processes, this method would
likely scale better with the demand for certificates. Prior
work showed that stealing certificates was the prevalent
method between 2003–2014 [11]. We aim to collect a newer
data set and to analyze how these trends are shifting, to
reason about the role of the certificate black market in the
production of digitally signed malware.
Q4: Who controls the abusive certificates? As the certifi-
cates themselves are the most valuable goods in the system
of code signing abuse, we aim to analyze signed malware
in the wild to infer who controls the abusive certificates—
whether it is the malware developers themselves or some
third parties that provide code signing services to malware
developers. We also aim to determine if this this evidence is
consistent with the business models observed in the vendor
analysis from Q1.
3. Data Collection
For our exploratory research, we follow an inductive
approach by developing and refining our model of the black
market based on the data. We collect data passively by
observing the certificate black market from multiple vantage
points. We do not interact with any of the actors (e.g.
we do not purchase any certificates or exchange messages
with the vendors), and we do not conduct any experiments
designed to influence their behavior—with the exception of
responsibly disclosing the abusive certificates to the CAs.
To answer Q1 and Q2, we start by exploring the black
market. We inspect black market websites where goods
related to code signing abuse are traded, analyze vendors
and their business models, and observe their activities. To
answer Q2, Q3 and Q4, we analyze samples of signed
malware and their connections to certificates and publishers.
Because certificate sales take place in private, and vendors
do not advertise information that would uniquely identify
their certificates (e.g. the serial numbers), it is challenging
to establish a direct link between the certificates traded
on the black market and the ones used to sign malware.
However, by comparing several distinguishing features of
certificates from the two datasets, we infer that a subset
of the certificates we found in malware had likely been
purchased from one of the vendors we monitor. This allows
us to connect better the supply and demand sides of Q2. In
this section, we describe our data collection and curation.
3.1. Black Market Data
To address the data collection challenge discussed in
Section 2.2, we start with a small number of publicly avail-
able, well-known websites (e.g. forums and marketplaces),
and use these websites to gradually expand our data set.
From these data sets, we conduct an investigation on the
vendors who trade code signing certificates. We then analyze
information about goods in stock over time to estimate the
portion of the black market that we have observed.
Due to the large variety of both structure and anti-
crawling protections the black market sites feature, an au-
tomatic analysis is rather difficult. Hence, we resort to
performing most of the inspection manually, using the sites
built-in search tools (search queries are issued for the
following strings of keywords: “code signing certificate”,
“code signing”, “sign”, “signature” and “sign certificate”
with Russian equivalents of these being search for as well
on Russian speaking forums). Automated data collection is
utilized where appropriate–e.g. for crawling stock informa-
tion to see stock updates over time.
Forums and Marketplaces. We begin with a set of well
known Internet forums (such as Hackforums), link direc-
tory sites (mostly on dark web, e.g. Torlinks) and general
marketplaces on dark web (such as Dream Market). We
then discover additional sites by following relevant links,
searching for user or vendor handles, and searching for the
keywords related to code signing certificates on Google and
other search engines. We expand our data set in this fashion
until we stop discovering new sites or we arrive at closed
forums that we are unable to access.
In total, we inspect 28 forums, 6 link directory websites
pointing to other more specialized web pages, 4 general
marketplaces, dozens of websites dedicated to various black
market goods (such as credit cards or PayPal accounts),
and one website specialized in selling anonymous code
signing certificates. While earlier reports by security com-
panies (such as one by InfoArmor [8]) reported on an
e-shop with anonymous code signing certificates named
certs4you, this e-shop was no longer accessible during
our research. However, one of the black market vendors
observed by us on a forum has set up a new e-shop with
anonymous certificates, Codesigning Guru, during the
period of our research. The sites that we investigated are
listed in Appendix A. Screenshots from both forum posts
and the e-shop can be found in Appendix B.
Vendors & Purchases. We have observed in total 4 vendors
operating across many forums (under the same handle) and
one e-shop, claimed to be set up by one of the observed
vendors. We gather information about the vendor activity
(registration date, post date, last edit date etc.).
4
Specifically, we focus on stock updates and vouches. To
encourage sales, vendors often provide information about
the remaining stock, which can be aggregated across forums.
Customers, on the other hand, sometimes provide vouches–
a claim that they have utilized the services offered by
the vendor and that the offer is not a scam–a mechanism
often used on the black market where establishing a trusted
relationship is difficult.
On the Codesigning Guru e-shop, payments for
certificates were handled through the Selly3, a platform
that facilitates purchases of digital products paid by digital
currencies. Through Selly widget, information about the
count of certificates on the stock was provided. Hence, we
have created a crawler that collected count of certificates on
stock every five minutes from 2017/08/25 till 2017/12/07.
The use of Selly enabled us to crawl the information by
accessing only the Selly widget and not loading the e-shop
website itself (in this way, our traffic was more difficult to
spot as the e-shop owner would have to get the information
about our periodic visits from Selly itself). This method is
similar to the basket inference proposed in [9], except that
we infer the vendor’s stock of certificates rather than the
content of the customers’ baskets.
Information about certificate stock was then used to
assess the size of the business and attempt to link the
observed sold certificates with certificates observed in the
second part–the collection of signed malware samples.
3.2. Signed Malware Data
Malware samples were collected over the course of
several months. Then, PUPs and binaries with unverifiable
signatures were filtered out, and only the correctly signed
malware was further analyzed.
Data Sources. Our dataset was collected using the Hunting
feature on VirusTotal 4–in this way, reports for all files that
are submitted to VirusTotal when the hunting is running
that satisfy a given condition are collected. In our case, the
condition was having more than 10 positive reports and the
hunting ran between 2017/04/18 and 2017/11/24. Since the
reports from hunting do not provide detailed information
about the signed binary, we re-query VirusTotal with the
list of SHA256 hashes caught by hunting using the private
API. The private API returns further information about
these hashes including the AV detections and the certificate
information–e.g. the issue date, the publisher name and the
signing date.
Once our filtering (description of which follows) is
applied and we are left with correctly signed malware only,
information about certificates are extracted.
Filtering for Signed Malware. To separate PUP from
malware, we have used approach introduced in prior work
[11]. First, we have calculated rmal rate as the fraction of
positive reports from total AVs that were used to scan the
sample. Then, we identified 12 keywords that are often used
3. www.selly.gg
4. www.virustotal.com
Item Count
Total samples 2,117,600
Malware 188,421
Correctly signed malware 14,221
Samples analyzed 14,221
Extracted certificates 1,163
Publisher names 1,073
Publisher Identities (PIs) 788
Non-singleton PIs 114
Distinct publisher names in non-singleton PIs 399
TABLE 1: Summary of counts of samples, certificates and
publishers as we proceeded through the data preparation
pipeline. Non-singleton PIs are PIs that correspond to at
least two distinct publisher names extracted from certifi-
cates.
in AV labels to indicate PUP, such as “pup” or “adware”.
We have then calculated rpup rate as the fraction of labels
including one of these keywords out of all positive AV
reports for given sample.
While probably not all of the AV labels indicating PUP
were caught with our simple 12-keyword approach, Figure
2 shows that there is a clear separation between a cluster
of samples that appear to be PUP (having higher rpup and
lower rmal) and a cluster of samples that appears to be
malware with high confidence (very low rpup an high rmal).
Hence, we decided to keep the thresholds used in previous
work and recognize samples that have rmal ≥ 0.33 and
rpup ≤ 0.1 as malware.
Since we want to analyze malware where the develop-
ers successfully managed to abuse code signing, we then
perform further filtering and keep only samples where the
signature was successfully verified by VirusTotal (that is,
the “Verify” flag says “Signed” in the sigcheck field). Table
1 provides the summary of the malware samples.
Responsible Disclosure. We have reported all the certifi-
cates we extracted from signed malware to the issuing CAs.
4. The Code Signing Black Market
As explained in Section 3.1, the black market appears to
be dominated by 4 vendors (A–D), whose presence ranges
from from 2 to 10 forums. We start our analysis by inves-
tigating the business practices of these vendors, aiming to
answer our first research question. Table 2 summarizes the
periods of activity of these vendors, the apparent sizes of
their businesses, and the products they offer.
4.1. Vendors
Presence. Vendor D operated on English speaking forums
only (2 forums in total); vendors A, C operated on Russian
forums only (10, resp. 3 forums); and vendor B, the most
active one, operated on both English and Russian forums
(5 English and 3 Russian), though he indicated to be of
Russian origin, at one point mentioning he was “expanding
his business [to the English forums]”.
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Figure 1: Simplified diagram of the signed malware analysis pipeline. Samples were collected on VirusTotal (1), then PUPs
were filtered out (2) and only malware with a valid signature was kept (3). Samples were then labeled using AVClass and
clustered using Publisher Identities (4). Finally, Malware Map was built (5) to analyze the relationship between the samples,
certificates and Publisher Identities.
Vendor Activity & Presence Inferred Sales Volume Products
First Joined Last Reply Forums Vouches Updates E-Shop Item: pieces Price ($)
A 2011-09-07 2015-05-25 3 0 - -
Standard: 1 1000
Standard: 10+ 800
Standard: 15+ 700
B
(Codesigning Guru) 2016-01-08 2017-08-08 8 3 7+ 41
Standard (Comodo) 350
Standard (Thawte) 500
EV 2500
C 2016-09-09 2017-01-27 10 0 - - EV (earlier posts) 1600EV (current) 3000
D 2017-03-07 2017-08-13 2 4 7+ -
Standard: 1 400
Standard: 5 1700
Standard: 10 3500
w/ SmartScreeen rep.: 1 800
w/ SmartScreeen rep.: 5 3700
w/ SmartScreeen rep.: 10 7000
TABLE 2: The leading black market vendors. We collected the forum activity on 2017/08/14 and the e-shop sales from
2017/08/25 till 2017/12/07. Because all the sales take place in private, vendors that appear inactive on the forums may still
be in business and we cannot observe the sales volume directly. We infer the sales volume from vouches, updates of counts
of certificates on stock and e-shop stock information crawl (where applicable).
Generally, our research started on the more known and
publicly accessible forums. However, we have encountered
most of the vendors already there and as we continued to
progress to forums that are more difficult to access, we still
encountered the same vendors again and again. (Eventually,
we have reached also forums that we were not able to access
due to the closed community.) In general, vendors usually
start on the more protected forums and then reach out to the
more public ones in order to expand their business.
During our observation period, the vendor B has broad-
ened his presence by setting up a new e-shop with anony-
mous certificates on Codesigning Guru at the begin-
ning of August 2017. Goods and prices generally matched
what these vendors were selling on the forums. The vendor
often promoted the URL of the e-shop on the forums to
direct potential customers there.
Activity. Generally, the activity of the vendors was surging.
While the oldest vendor A appeared not to be very active
anymore, with all posts from 2015 with no updates, the two
vendors with the largest presence, B, and D, were building
it in the last months. The three more recent vendors B, C,
D all had half or more of their posts (threads) established
after May 2017.
The two most active vendors B and D regularly updated
their posts (approx. once or twice per month) and provided
replies and stock updates. On major forums, such a thread
often contained over 10 public comments of forum users
and over 10 replies and updates from the vendor.
Mechanisms. Vendors generally start a new thread on a
forum, detail their offerings in the first post and then update
the post over time with new features, price changes, etc.
Other users ask questions and provide vouches (reviews of
successful purchases). Vendors answer questions and some-
times provide updates regarding their stock. All purchases
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Figure 2: Graph showing separation between malware and
PUP clusters. White color represents the lowest concentra-
tion of samples, violet the largest. Black rectangle shows the
threshold values and marks the area of samples that were
considered malware
take place in private, usually over jabber or messaging
service built into the forum platform (which often utilizes
jabber as well). Hence, estimating sales and dates of last
activity is difficult.
Vendors generally use the same handle (username)
across the forums to keep their reputation. The format and
content of the post are often exactly the same. For linking
vendor identity across forums, we have used vendor contact
information, handle, post content and post format–contact
information were sometimes missing (relying on the forum’s
built-in messaging system), then we relied on the other
properties.
Business Model. At all vendors, the business model was
simple: selling anonymous code signing certificates. This is
surprising, as previous reports [8] had reported Signature-
as-a-Service providers in the past. However, even though
we searched for general keywords such as “signature” and
“certificate” (as described in Section 3.1), we were not able
to find evidence of any other business model aside from
selling certificates.
All vendors claim that their certificates are freshly is-
sued, that is, that they have not been stolen in any way but
obtained directly from a CA. Further, all vendors claimed
that they sell one certificate into the hands of just one client,
and some even offered free or cheap one-time reissue if the
certificate was blacklisted too soon. Vendors did not appear
to be concerned with revocation, often stating that it usually
“takes ages” until a CA revokes an abused certificate.
4.2. Goods and Deals
Goods. Inventories of all four observed vendors are rather
similar. Vendors A, D focus on general code signing cer-
tificates, vendor C offers EV certificates only and the most
active vendor B (who is behind the Codesigning Guru
e-shop) offers both types of certificates.
All vendors claim that certificates are fresh, obtained
directly from a CA. For customers, this should be easy to
confirm by checking the issue date, as certificates appeared
to be sold very soon after being put on the stock by the
vendor. Some vendors even claim to obtain the certificate on
demand, having the certificate issued once a customer pays
half of the price. Interestingly, vendor A even claims that
he always has a few publisher identities prepared and the
customer can then choose which of these publisher names
he wants to have his certificate issued on.
Certificates with Built SmartScreen Reputation. Espe-
cially on forums that appear more beginner centered, less
proficient users often appeared to not have a clear idea
about how code signing works, but rather just seeing that
SmartScreen blocked their unsigned malware from being
launched or produced undesirable warnings. Hence, on these
forums, vendors often explain how code signing works in
their posts and include keywords like “bypass SmartScreen”
in their post titles indicating that this is what less proficient
malware developers search for.
With general (non-EV) code signing certificates,
SmartScreen reputation first needs to be built-up before mal-
ware can be installed and executed without issuing warnings.
Vendor D offers certificates with an already built reputation
for double the price of a certificate without reputation.
Vendor B (Codesigning Guru) does not offer certifi-
cates with positive reputation unless a special demand is
filed. Moreover, FAQ on Codesigning Guru mentions
that approx. 2000-3000 installs of benign files on Win-
dows 10 systems are needed in order to establish sufficient
SmartScreen reputation to avoid warnings.
Prices. The prices for standard code signing certificates
range from $350 to $500. Vendor D offers certificates from
various CAs (citing Comodo, Thawte, DigiCert, Symantec),
all for $400. The most active vendor B differentiates pricing
by CA: a Comodo certificate costs $350 while Thawte
certificates (which are more trusted, according to the vendor)
cost $500 each; Appendix C includes a sample post from
this vendor. The vendors often offer bulk discounts.
EV certificates are considerably more expensive. Earlier
posts by vendor C list a price of $1600, while more recent
posts by the same vendor offer EV certificates for $3000.
Vendor B sells EV certificates for $2500 (both in the forums
and in the Codesigning Guru e-shop). The EV certifi-
cates come pre-installed on USB tokens, which the vendors
then send to the buyers by post. As CAs require more
rigorous vetting procedures before issuing EV certificates,
the supply is more limited than for standard certificates. In
particular, vendors A and D do not offer EV certificates.
The posts advertising EV certificates that we collected from
vendors B and C did not specify the issuing CA.
4.3. Sales Volume
Forums: Vouches & Stock Updates. As all purchases on
forums take place in private, it is difficult to estimate sales
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Certificates Total Average per month
Items sold Revenue ($) Items sold Revenue ($)
Comodo 29 10,150 8.36 2,928
Thawte 12 6,000 3.46 1,731
Total 41 16,150 11.83 4,659
TABLE 3: Sales volume recorded on Codesigning Guru
between 2017/08/25–2017/12/07.
counts precisely. In Table 2 we report the number of vouches
for each vendor, as vouches are the method for trust on the
black market, with users claiming they have used the service
and providing a short review of it. However, the customers
may choose not to submit a vouch even after successful
transactions. Since we have observed very few vouches (2
for vendor B and 4 for vendor D), estimating sales precisely
with this method is not feasible.
A more fruitful resource are stock updates that are some-
times provided by the vendors (even though they should be
taken with a grain of salt since they obviously might not be
true). For the most active vendor B, we have aggregated in
total 17 stock updates across 6 forums. We have for example
observed that at one point four code signing certificates were
sold in just four days and in another period no certificate
sold in 14 days. However, while stock updates might be
good to get a very general impression about sales and pro-
vide information over short-term periods, estimating long-
term sales is challenging.
E-Shop: Stock Information Crawl. Our third approach
is to analyse the stock information on the Codesigning
Guru e-shop. By using the method described in Section 3.1,
we can infer when certificate sales are completed on this site.
Backed by vendor B, the most active of the four black
market vendors, the e-shop offers Comodo and Thawte
standard code signing certificates, as well as EV certificates
issued by unspecified CAs. While EV certificates are ob-
tained on demand, the e-shop publishes stock availability
for standard certificates. During our 104-day observation
period (from 2017/08/25 to 2017/12/07), we have recorded
41 standard certificate sales. The average rate of sales for
the e-shop was 11.8 certificates per month, bringing in a
total revenue of $16,150 (see Table 3).
The demand appears to be rather high, as the stock
availability suggests that certificates are often sold within
one day of being put on the stock. Additionally, as the
vendor claims that the certificates are freshly issued, we can
infer the issue dates of the certificates sold on the e-shop;
we analyze this information in Section 6.
5. Signed Malware Analysis
While conducting the study on the code signing black
market, we observed that the market is active and the
vendors have a potential of scaling the business. This raises
three questions about the demand for certificates: (1) how
connected the whole ecosystem is—whether an abused cer-
tificate could somehow lead us to another abused one, and
if there are indications of cooperation among malware de-
velopers; (2) how prevalent the certificates issued for abuse
are among the signed malware and (3) who takes control of
those certificates.
We focus on malware since it benefits the most from
using anonymous certificates, as code signing helps malware
bypass protections [11] and anonymous certificates do not
reveal the identity of the malware creators. We collect
malware with valid digital signatures, as described in sec-
tion 3.2. To analyze the signed malware ecosystem, we intro-
duce an abstraction, the Signed Malware Map, that captures
the relationships and communities among the malware and
the abusive certificates. We then map the characteristics and
connections in the system in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, examine
prevalence of certificates issued for abuse in Section 5.3,
and investigate who controls the certificates in Section 5.4.
5.1. The Signed Malware Map
Here we introduce the Signed Malware Map, which cap-
tures the code signing abuse ecosystem. The signed malware
map is a graph reflecting the relationship among malware
families and the certificates they use. We first introduce the
preparation of the entities that the graph consists of. Then,
we describe the construction of the signed malware map.
Clustering Publishers. We observe that multiple certificates
from signed malware tend to be issued to what appears
to be one publisher company identity with slight variation
in the publisher name. A similar finding was reported for
PUP publishers [14]. For the malicious actor who requests
these certificates from CAs, this provides the benefit of not
having to set up multiple fake identities, while preventing
the revocation of multiple certificates belonging to the same
malicious publisher.
We tried to apply the publisher clustering technique
proposed in prior work [14], which utilizes the normalized
edit distance. However, we found out that it was not an
effective approach in our case because (1) publishers with
different company names with low edit distance (for ex-
ample companies with short names) ended up in the same
cluster even though the publisher identity seemed to be
different and (2) most of the certificates did not contain
precise street address to help with the clustering.
Hence, we have developed our own approach. Most of
the variations in publisher names appeared to be in non-letter
characters, such as commas, dashes, quotes and sometimes
even backticks. More interestingly, the exact same publisher
names have often appeared with different suffices to indicate
the company type, such as ”Ltd.” and ”OOO” (Russian
version of Ltd.)–even though publisher country stays the
same. An example might be the following three publisher
names:
• Ltd ”Vet Faktor”
• OOO, Vet - Faktor
• LLC ”VET FAKTOR”
Our technique for clustering the publishers then comprised
of (1) removing all company type identification substrings
8
such as ”LLC” and ”Co.”, (2) removing all non-letter char-
acters such as dashes, commas and spaces, (3) converting the
string to lowercase and (4) comparing the resulting strings
for exact match. We then examined manually a subset of the
samples, to validate the publisher-name clusters produced
by our technique. We refer to a cluster of publisher names
(matched as described above) as a Publisher Identity (PI).
Over a third (37.19%) of publisher names extracted from
certificates belong to a non-singleton PI (that is, there exists
a different publisher name that matches the same Publisher
Identity). Count of unique publisher names, PIs, and other
statistics are listed in Table 1.
AVClass Labeling. Only clustering of the publishers by
itself does not provide enough connections between the
certificates and publisher names. Hence, our next step to
build analyzable communities was to label the samples with
malware family names they are recognized as belonging to–
we used AVClass tool [21] to extract the malware family
information from AV labels. This step enabled us to build the
complete map (network) of malware description of which
follows.
For the labeling process, AVClass was left in its default
configuration apart from whitelisting the word ”confidence”
so that AVClass would not consider it a malware family
name. This was determined by analysis of the labeled data–
after performing the labeling, we have examined outlier
families. Family named ”confidence” had most samples and
certificates, but when we inspected the AV labels that led to
individual samples being labeled as ”confidence” family, we
discovered that this was due to many AVs providing confi-
dence level in the label (e.g. ”malicious confidence100%”)
and AVClass accidentally considering this a family name.
Hence, we whitelisted the term ”confidence” so that it would
not be treated as a malware family name. (Other outliers
with many samples and certificates appeared to represent
genuine large malware campaigns, such as the labeled Zusy
spyware, Loskad trojan, and iCloader and Loadmoney being
on the border of PUP and droppers.)
Building the Signed Malware Map. To analyze the rela-
tionships and communities of PIs and certificates, we have
built a graph. There are two types of nodes: (1) nodes
representing a malware family and (2) nodes representing
a PI. There is an edge between a malware family and a PI
if there exists a sample that belongs to this malware family
and is signed by a certificate issued to this PI. Moreover,
there is an edge between two malware families if there are
two samples, each of them belonging to one of the families,
that are signed with the same certificate. (Hence, the graph
is not bipartite.) To further simplify the graph, we exclude
all singleton malware families–that is, families that contain
just one sample, as they do not provide any new connections
between publishers and malware families and hence do not
contribute significantly to the overview of relationships.
The assumption behind this construction is that if two
samples of malware belong to the same malware family,
there is a high chance that the same team of malware
developers is behind both of the samples.
Figure 3: A smaller component consisting of 3 malware
families (blue) and 5 PIs (yellow).
We create direct connections between malware families
that share a certificate to avoid introducing a third type
of nodes representing certificates, which would add further
complexity to the graph. The Signed Malware Map reflects
the fact that a connection through a certificate is stronger
than through a PI. In the first case, the same entity con-
trolling the certificate signed malware from both families
(whether it’s the developer himself or some 3rd party). In
the second case, a 3rd party might have just obtained two
different certificates for the same PI and shared it with two
different malware developer teams (without actually seeing
what they are signing with it).
5.2. Analysis of the Code signing Abuse Ecosystem
First, we analyze the structure of the Signed Malware
Map, by inspecting the strongly connected components.
Such components may arise from stable business connec-
tions among the participants in the ecosystem. We have
observed one dominant component that contains most of
the samples as well as certificates (issued mostly to Rus-
sian publishers). The remaining nodes are parts of a large
number of small components that always contain only a
small number of samples and certificates (issued mostly to
Chinese publishers). While we expected to observe similar
distributions distributions of characteristics among malware
samples, regardless of which component they are part of,
we find interesting differences. The distributions of some
characteristics are completely different (e.g. publisher coun-
try, issuer) and others are more similar but still feature
significant differences (e.g. issue-to-abuse interval). Because
these contrasts may reflect differences in the use of code-
signing certificates and in the confidence in the certificate
black market, we divide the nodes into these two groups in
the rest of this section.
Components. Interestingly, the map consists of one large
component (we will refer to it as Major Component, or
MC) which encompasses 69.73% certificates and 60.53%
PIs. Other than that, there are 196 small components, none
of which contains more than 11 certificates and 9 PIs. A
typical smaller component consisting of 3 malware families
and 5 PIs is shown in Figure 3.
Connectivity of MC. Interestingly, if we remove the PI
nodes and consider the induced subgraph—that is, we
consider only nodes representing malware families and
edges between them that represent certificates shared among
families—most of the MC remains strongly connected, with
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Item Total in MC % in MC
Samples 14,221 13337 93.78%
Certificates 1,163 811 69.73%
PIs 788 477 60.53%
Families 317 157 49.53%
TABLE 4: Summary of counts of samples, certificates and
publishers in the major component. Only non-singleton fam-
ilies (that is, families with more than one sample) are taken
into account. MC stands for Major Component.
Figure 4: Distribution of publisher countries based on com-
ponent.
only 7 malware families out of total 157 getting separated.
(Unfortunately, the graph is too big to be included in this
paper.)
This strong connectivity suggests that malware developer
teams in MC either share certificates or use the same 3rd
party service for signing their files. As discussed in Section
4, we did not find evidence of signing services, and the
vendors claim that the certificates are freshly issued (a claim
we further investigate in Section 5.3). In consequence, it ap-
pears that malware developer teams themselves control their
certificates. Then, this type of strong connectivity would
indicate strong cooperation among malware developer teams
behind samples from the MC.
Characteristics. Table 4 summarizes the distribution of
samples, certificates etc. among the Major Component and
other smaller components. As we can see, a majority of
samples, as well as abused certificates, are in the MC. At the
same time, as shown in Figure 4, the majority of certificates
in MC are issued to Russian and Ukrainian publishers,
while in the smaller components, Chinese certificates are
dominant. Overall, Russian publishers are by far the most
prevalent in abused certificates. This corresponds to the
observation that 3 of the 4 black market vendors target
Russian speaking audiences (see Section 4.1).
Figure 5 shows the distribution of abused certificates
across CAs. Most of the certificates from our corpus of
signed malware had been issued by Comodo. Additionally,
Comodo and GoDaddy have more certificates in MC while
Figure 5: Distribution of CAs based on component.
other CAs have the majority of their abused certificates in
the smaller components.
5.3. The Prevalence of Certificates Issued for Abuse
We aim to estimate which method of abuse—legitimate
but compromised certificates or certificates issued straight
for the use of malware authors—accounts for most of the
digitally signed malware from 2017. Prior work [11] iden-
tified compromised certificates by searching for certificates
used to sign both benign files and malware. More recently
SmartScreen protections have been built into Windows 10
at operating system level [18], driving vendors and mal-
ware developers to build up SmartScreen reputation by
first signing and distributing benign files before using the
certificate to sign malware (see Section 4). In consequence,
the existence of both benign files and malware signed with
the same certificate is no longer a strong indication that the
certificate was compromised.
We therefore introduce a new technique for estimating
how many certificates are issued straight to abusers. We
measure the delay between certificate issue date and the date
when the certificate was first abused. Often, malware devel-
opers utilize Trusted Time Stamping to extend the validity of
their malware past the certificate’s expiration date. In total,
603 out of the observed 1,163 abused certificates have been
used to sign at least one time-stamped file. We utilize these
certificates to compute an upper bound for the issue-to-abuse
interval, as neither the trusted timestamps nor the issue dates
can be tampered with. Since the Time Stamp is signed by
a Time Stamping Authority, it guarantees that the piece of
malware was signed at this date. For each certificate, we
select the file that has the earliest date of Time Stamping
and use this date as the date of abuse.
Hence, we know that certificate was either issued straight
to abusers or compromised at some point during this inter-
val. For stolen certificates, we expect that they are uniformly
likely to be stolen and abused at any point during their
lifetime, as suggested by Figure 5 from [11]. However,
certificates issued straight to abusers are more likely to be
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Figure 6: Interval from issue date to the date of first malware being signed and timestamped with a certificate.
sold and used soon after being issued. In consequence, a
spike of abuse during the first couple of months would
be inconsistent with a prevalence of compromised certifi-
cates; instead, these certificates would more likely have been
traded on the black market.
Result. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the time-to-abuse
(in months), computed as described above and grouped
according to whether the certificate is in MC or not. Both
groups show a tendency for abusing certificates within the
first two months after issuance, with more pronounced
spikes for the MC.
Code signing certificates are usually issued for 1, 2 or
3 years. The distribution of the time-to-abuse reflects this
fact. Between 3–12 months, and between 13–24 months,
the time-to-abuse is close to a uniform distribution (this is
also true during the 25–36 month interval, excluded from
the figure). However, there is a sharp spike in the 1st and
2nd month—indicating that a large number of certificates are
abused quickly after they are issued. Overall, from among
all the certificates we extracted from timestamped malware,
around 55% are abused in the first two months (with around
45% in the first month). While there are significant spikes
for certificates outside of MC, certificates in MC exhibit the
sharpest drop after the second month: in MC, more than 10
times more certificates are abused in the first month than
on average in months 3-12. Figure 7 shows the same phe-
nomenon as a cumulative distribution; among all certificates
that are eventually used to sign malware in MC, around 60%
are abused in the first month, and around 70% in the first
two months, after issuance.
This result corroborates the vendors’ claims that they
sell fresh certificates, discussed in Section 4. Moreover, this
timing pattern is unlikely to arise if most certificates used
to sign malware are legitimate, but compromised, certifi-
cates. The certificates abused within the first month were
probably obtained with the aim of signing malicious code.
Additionally, the early spikes in the distribution represent
lower bounds for the number of certificates issued straight
to abusers, as some malware authors may be saving these
certificates for later use.
Outside of MC, more certificates are abused during
months 3–12 than inside MC. This could correspond to
a higher reliance on compromised certificates, but it could
also reflect a greater reluctance for burning the certificates
quickly, as signing malware may result in the certificate
being revoked or losing SmartScreen reputation. In contrast,
the prevalence of certificates abused within 1–2 months in
MC suggests that the malware authors from that community
are not worried about burning their code signing certificates.
This may reflect a confidence in a reliable supply of fresh
anonymous certificates, perhaps due to tight business con-
nections among underground actors contributing to a higher
degree of mutual trust.
In consequence, the distribution of the time-to-abuse is
consistent with the hypothesis that most of the certificates
found in our corpus of signed and timestamped malware
had been issued straight to the black market—at least for
a tight-knit underground community that accounts for most
of the digitally signed malware.
5.4. Certificate-Controlling Parties
Our next goal is to infer who controls certificates—
whether malware developers themselves control them or
if they utilize third-party signing services. While we did
not find any references for signing services during our
investigation of the black market from Section 4, we aim to
corroborate this observation with evidence from the signed
malware analysis. Specifically, if one certificate signs sam-
ples from a large number of families, this would point to a
third party who controls the certificates and offers signing
services to multiple malware developers. On the other hand,
if a certificate is used to sign only malware from only a
small number of families, then would be consistent with
a development team that is responsible for these malware
families and that controls the certificate.
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Figure 7: Percentage of certificates abused within specified
number of days after being issued.
Certificate Point of View. Figure 8 shows that most of the
certificates are used to sign fewer than 40 samples among
4 or fewer families—an indication that they are probably
in the hands of the specific development team behind these
few families.
Although there are some outliers that signed malware
from more than 10 families (with 2 of the certificates having
more than one hundred), it seems that signing lot of malware
across many families is not the trend. We performed a
manual inspection to see what families are signed with these
outliers and the families are mostly singletons (families with
only one sample). This fact points to two possibilities: either
these samples were not recognized by AVs as belonging
to one specific family/development team even though they
actually do belong to one team, or some signature providing
services are used for malware campaigns that comprise of
only one or few samples. However, most of the certificates
are used to sign malware across few families, which is con-
sistent with a business model where malware development
teams usually acquire code signing certificates for their own
use, perhaps by turning to the black market vendors.
Malware Family Point of View. Observing the situation
from the other side, Figure 9 provides insight on the problem
from point of view of malware families. Similarly, most
families use fewer than 10 samples and fewer than 5 certifi-
cates, suggesting that there is usually not much variation in
certificates used to sign malware from one family. This is
also consistent with the hypothesis that each development
team controls its own certificates and does not have access
to a large inventory of code-signing certificates. However,
we also observe some outliers—malware families with over
500 samples and 100 certificates in some cases. Figure 9
labels the families that represent the biggest outliers.
6. Linking Abused and Traded Certificates
To gather additional evidence for the role of the cer-
tificate black market in the landscape of digitally signed
Figure 8: Samples and count of families per certificate.
Figure 9: Samples and count of certificates per malware
family.
malware, we aim to determine if some of the certificates
from our VT dataset had been purchased from the vendors
we monitored. Unfortunately, it is challenging to identify
precisely which certificates originated from the black mar-
ket. Establishing a direct link between a traded certificate
and a certificate extracted from a malware sample would
require matching a unique identifier for the certificate (such
as the serial number), but the vendors do not provide such
information. Instead, we establish indirect links by matching
several certificate properties, which would be unlikely to
coincide by chance. Specifically, we search our corpus of
signed malware samples for certificates that probably had
been purchased from the Codesigning Guru e-shop.
Data Overview. As explained in Section 3.1, we collected
the stock information on the black-market certificate e-
shop at 5-minute intervals. We made the observation that
individual certificates were always added to the stock one-
by-one. Even when 4 certificates were added within 4 hours
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in one morning, each of them was put on stock separately,
with gaps of at least 10 minutes between the stock updates.
According to the e-shop owner (vendor B), these certifi-
cates are fresh, acquired directly from CAs. We conjecture
that the owner adds certificates to the stock right after
obtaining them, with the time required for completing the
issuance procedures accounting for the delays between stock
updates. This would imply that the date when a certificate
comes on stock usually corresponds to the certificate’s issue
date.
Besides the likely issue date, two additional pieces of
information can help us narrow down the list of certificates
that could have been traded on the e-shop. For each certifi-
cate offered on the e-shop, we also know the issuing CA,
as the stock availability is provided separately for Comodo
and Thawte certificates (see Table 3). Furthermore, the e-
shop owner claimed on a forum that all certificates sold on
Codesigning Guru were issued to British publishers.
Linking the Certificates. We compare the dates when
individual certificates came on stock to the issue dates of
certificates in our VT dataset of signed malware. Among
all the abused certificates matching the criteria described
above, we compute the fraction for which the issue dates
coincide with e-shop stock updates. This limits the analysis
to certificates that are used to sign malware shortly after
they are issued; this usage is not uncommon, as discussed
in Section 5.3.
We find a strong correlation for Thawte certificates. Dur-
ing our observation period (from 2017/08/25 to 2017/12/07),
11 Thawte certificates came on stock in the e-shop. How-
ever, 2 of these certificates were added during the same
5-min interval, and 2 other certificates were added during
the same day, but at different times. In other words, Thawte
stock updates occurred on only 9 days, which represent 8.7%
of the days within our observation period. During the same
104-day period, 145 certificates from our VT dataset were
issued. Out of these, 10 (6.9%) are from Thawte and 11
(7.6%) have a British publisher. 5 certificates used to sign
malware from the VT dataset meet all our matching criteria:
they were issued by Thawte to a British publisher during our
observation period. If the CA is equally likely to issue a
certificate on any day during this period, the likelihood that
the certificate’s issue date coincides with an e-shop stock
update, by pure chance, is 8.7%. In fact, each of 5 matching
certificates was issued on a date when a Thawte certificate
was added to the e-shop’s stock; the likelihood to observe
this by chance is 0.0005%.
Inspecting the Publishers. As the abused certificates that
had likely been purchased from Codesigning Guru represent
a substantial portion of the Thawte stock sold there (5 out
of 12 certificates, or 42%), we take a closer look at the
publishers named in these certificates to gain additional
insights into vendor B’s methods. We search these pub-
lishers in the beta version of the British public register of
companies5. All the publisher names correspond to young
companies, some incorporated around a month before their
5. beta.companieshouse.gov.uk
code signing certificate was issued. We did not find evidence
suggesting that these companies have software development
as their primary focus. However, we were not able to
find out the companies’ contact information, so we could
not confirm their need for using code signing certificates.
We hypothesize that these publishers correspond to either
(1) shell companies incorporated by a malicious adversary
who uses them to request code signing certificates, in an
effort to conceal the owner’s real identity; or (2) legitimate
companies that the adversary is able to impersonate, perhaps
by using data mined from the public register.
7. Discussion
Our results suggest that it is possible for specialized
vendors to set up a reliable process for obtaining code-
signing certificates from CAs. The underground trade is
growing, and at least one segment of the customer base,
represented by the MC cluster, demonstrates a degree of
confidence in the reliability of the certificate supply. While
this confidence may be the result of tight business connec-
tions among the actors in this cluster, in the future other
malware authors may turn to this black market, as long
as the vendors continue to provide a reliable supply of
code signing certificates. This warrants further investigation
into the methods the vendors use to pass the CAs’ identity
verification processes and into the best ways to prevent the
abuse. Based on our exploratory analysis, we suggest two
ways to raise the bar for underground certificate vendors.
Revoking Matching Publisher Names. Our research shows
that, for over a third (37.19%) of publisher names we
have extracted from the abused certificates, more abused
certificates exist that use, in general, the same publisher
name with only slight modifications (e.g. added backticks
our quotes around the publisher name). Hence, if a CA
finds out a certificate has been issued straight to the black
market and should be revoked, it would be desirable to also
investigate other certificates issued for similarly-named PIs
and to revoke them if necessary.
Standardization of Publisher Name Format. Since com-
paring publisher names as we did in our research is not very
efficient for large datasets, it would be desirable to standard-
ize the way the publisher name is listed in the certificate
(with/without commas, quotes, in the same way as it is listed
in a public registry etc.) to make comparing publishers and
revoking all certificates issued on (for example) one bogus
company identity easier.
8. Related work
We discuss related work in the three key areas: (1)
measuring anonymous online marketplaces (i.e., black mar-
kets), (2) code signing abuse, and (3) analysis of economic
relationships using graphs.
Black market studies. Christin [5] measured Silk Road,
one of the largest anonymous online black markets in 2011
and 2012; the black market was operated as a Tor hidden
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service. He found that narcotics were mostly and actively
sold and traded in the black market and that the revenue of
this black market was $1.2 million a month. He also showed
that the daily sales and the number of the items traded
on the black market were increasing during his observation
period. In October 2013, Silk Road was terminated; then,
other anonymous online marketplaces (e.g., Silk Road 2,
Sheep Marketplace, etc.) started appearing and taking over
the anonymous online market service of Silk Road. Sosca et
al. [22] analyzed how the Silk Road shut-down affected the
anonymous online marketplaces by measuring 16 alternative
anonymous black markets. Their observation is in line with
Christin’s study; most trading items (70%) were narcotics.
They also found that only a few vendors were very success-
ful while most vendors earned less than $10,000 in their
entire observation period.
While lots of physical merchandise (e.g. the aforemen-
tioned narcotics) are sold on these general black markets
such as Silk Road, we were not able to find any offer for
code signing certificates on such marketplaces–these appear
to be sold usually either on forums or dedicated e-shops.
Code signing PKI abuse. There are a few attempts to
examine the code signing PKI abuse and factors. First,
Sophos [28] measured the signed Windows PE files they
collected between 2008 and 2010. They found that the
number of signed malicious PE files (e.g., Potentially Un-
wanted Programs, malware, etc.) was increasing in their
study interval. In line with Sophos’ study, Kotzias et al. [14]
and Alrawi et al. [1] also observed that most of the signed
malicious PE files they examined were PUPs. While the
abuse factors were not discussed in the previous studies,
Kim et al. [11] focused solely on signed malware (excluding
PUPs) and the abuse factors. They showed that most signed
malware resulted from stolen private keys and also that a
lot of signed malware contained an invalid or malformed
signature.
Compared to these studies, we focused only on malware
that is correctly signed and attempted to document the
black market where the certificates came from, which was
not previously studied. While a majority of samples in the
dataset used by Kotzias et al. were PUPs, we excluded PUPs
altogether and focused only on malicious signed binaries.
Compared to Kim et. al, we focused solely on malware
where the signatures can be properly verified and used a
newer dataset that enabled us to amass much more samples
of signed malware and document the current trends–while
Kim et. al have shown that in 2014 and earlier, most certifi-
cates used to sign malware were obtained by stealing private
keys, we document a new trend of obtaining anonymous
certificates straight from the CAs that appears to have gained
traction during 2016 and 2017.
In a separate study, conducted in parallel with ours,
Recorded Future has analyzed the underground markets trad-
ing code signing certificates [2]. While their work focuses
on monitoring the certificate vendors and does not collect
or analyze a dataset of signed malware, their findings are in
line with ours—there are 4 certificate vendors who obtain
their certificates directly from the CAs, instead of stealing
existing certificates from software developers. The Recorded
Future study also reports an interaction with a vendor, to
sign a new malware sample with a recently issued Comodo
certificate, in order to confirm the effectiveness of digital
signatures in bypassing anti-virus detections. In contrast, we
collect data passively to avoid influencing the behavior of
the underground markets.
Graph analysis. Kotzias et al. continued their study of
PUPs in 2016 and 2017 by analyzing a network of people
and companies behind Spain-based PUP campaigns, using
entity graphs and leveraging also information available in
code signing certificates used to sign the PUPs [13]. By
combining this information with company registers and
other sources, they were able to comprehensibly map the
PUP network.
The core difference to our work here is that PUP distrib-
utors may sign their software using their own identity (and
a legitimately obtained certificate), as PUP programs like
adware are not obviously malicious. Malware developers,
on the other hand, are keen to conceal their identity, hence
the need for the underground markets with anonymous code
signing certificates that we were trying to provide an in-
sight in. Therefore, in our analysis, we used the certificates
and publisher information in them to create links between
malware families, the developer teams behind them, and the
black market vendors. But we did not attribute these cam-
paigns to real-world people and companies, as the identity
of publishers might have been either forged or stolen.
9. Conclusions
We conduct an exploratory analysis of the black markets
trading code signing certificates. We investigate 4 black
market vendors with one of them setting up an e-shop
specialized on code signing certificates and selling more
than 10 certificates per month with the total of $16,150
in revenue during our observation period. Using a dataset
of signed malware that we have collected, we support the
vendors’ claims that the certificates are obtained straight
from the CAs by showing that around 45% of all abused
certificates are used to sign malware within a month after
they are issued. We further analyze the relationships between
the certificates, publishers and malware families to show that
individual developer teams appear to be in control of their
own certificates.
Our research provides evidence consistent with a shift
in the code-signing abuse ecosystem toward obtaining the
certificates straight from the CAs. Once specialized vendors
establish reliable processes for obtaining certificates in this
manner, this model scales better with the demand than a
model that relies on compromised certificates. We suggest
two practical ways to make this abuse more difficult: search-
ing for certificates issued to similarly named publishers and
revoking them as appropriate, and standardizing the format
for publisher names. More importantly our exploratory re-
sults explain the existence of a growing black market for
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code-signing certificates, and they warrant further investiga-
tion into the methods the underground vendors use to obtain
fresh certificates.
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Appendix A.
List of Inspected Sites
In total, 1 e-shop specializing in code-signing certifi-
cates, 28 forums, 4 general markets and 6 link directory
sites were inspected during the black market investigation–
all of these are listed below. Dozens of sites specialized
on other goods (such as stolen Credit Cards and Paypal
accounts) that were mentioned at the listed link directory
sites were inspected as well, but they are not listed here
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since (1) as expected, they did not provide any value or
hints of code-signing certificates, (2) this absence of value
was not surprising (as opposed to general markets where we
expected to find anonymous code signing certificates), (3)
their addresses were extracted from the link directory sites
listed here and (4) the space in this section is limited.
Note that the Alphabay general market was not inspected
since this research was carried out shortly after Alphabay
has been taken down by law enforcement. All the URLs
are given as they were valid during our research period
(especially some of the darknet ones might not be valid
anymore).
A.1. E-Shop with Anonymous Code-Signing Cer-
tificates
codesigning.guru
A.2. Forums
hackforums.net
antichat.ru
0day.su
freehacks.ru
nulled.to
bitcointalk.org
sinister.ly
hpc.name
searchengines.guru
binaryvision.co.il
bitcointalk.org
offensivecommunity.net
russianelite.ws verified.ws
fsell.bz
forum.zloy.bs
elitepvpers.com
carder.su
prologic.su
thecc.bz
abusewith.us
v3rmillion.net
Crutop.nu
cardx.biz
cop.su
wordcarding.su
psh-world.ru
crimezone.org
elitepvpers.com/forum
A.3. General Markets
hansamkt2rr6nfg3.onion (Hansa)
lchudifyeqm4ldjj.onion (Dream Market)
traderouteilbgzt.onion (Trade Route)
trdealmgn4uvm42g.onion (theRealDeal)
A.4. Link Directory Sites
deepdotweb.com
torlinkbgs6aabns.onion (Torlinks)
underdj5ziov3ic7.onion (UnderDir)
onionsnjajzkhm5g.onion
zgrl6sghf5jh37zz.onion
tt3j2x4k5ycaa5zt.onion
Appendix B.
Forum and E-Shop Screenshots
Code signing certificates are often advertised on black
market forums. Some posts include even rich graphics. An
example post is shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11 depicts
a diagram of code signing certificate purchase from other
black market post.
Figure 10: Example post offering code signing certificates
on the black market.
The main page of the codesigning guru e-shop is shown
in Figure 12 along with the page where Comodo code
signing certificates can be purchased in Figure 13.
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Figure 11: Code signing certificate purchase workflow illus-
trated in a black market post.
Figure 12: Main page of the codesigning guru e-shop.
Appendix C.
Advertisement Post Example
I’m selling anonymous code signing cert-
ificates.
Why do I need to sign my files?
- to avoid UAC warnings
- to pass SmartScreen filter* ("Unknown
publisher")
- to pass some AVs which are blocking
any unsigned executables
- to make your macros and VBA objects
more trusted
What files can I sign?
- 32 and 64-bit applications (.exe,
.cab, .dll, .ocx, .msi, .xpi and .xap)
Figure 13: Page for buying Comodo code signing certificates
in the codesigning guru e-shop.
- Drivers (EV certificates only)
- Java applications
- Apple applications
- VBA objects, scripts and macros for
Microsoft Office .doc, .xls, and .ppt
files
Certificate types
- regular code signing certificate
(class 3): you’ll get the archive
with PFX and a password.
Regular certs should gain a reputation
before they pass SmartScreen filter
(contact me for details)
- EV Code Signing cert: you’ll get a
USB token with pre-installed certificate
via mail or courier.
EV certificates are the only ones that
you can use for signing drivers for
Win10.
Also they have a positive SmartScreen
reputation out-of-the-box, so no SS
warnings will appear.
What you get
- Unique and never used before
Code Signing certificate from trusted
Certificate Authority, valid for 1 year.
- Free code signing tool with GUI
(if needed)
- All certificates are issued for
real companies
Disclaimer
- I DO NOT resell certificates
17
from other sellers.
- I guarantee that your certificate is
unique.
- I DO NOT offer one-time signing.
Pricing
- Comodo (most common): $350
- Thawte (more trusted than Comodo):
$600
- EV code signing certs: $3000
- Free exchange: if your cert becomes
blacklisted by AVs, you can get one
re-issue for free.
- Escrow accepted
- All payments by Bitcoin only.
Current stock:
- Comodo: 2
- Thawte: 0 (pre-order and get it in
3-5 days)
- EV Code Signing: 0 (pre-order and
get it in 2-3 weeks)
Contacts
- Jabber: <e-mail address removed>
(use OTR please)
- PM me
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